University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 50

Number 1

Article 4

2019

The Consumer Healthcare Data Market: Redefining Healthcare
Mergers Through The Linked Consumer Retail Data and Health
Insurance Markets
Thaddeus Sheehy Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Sheehy, Thaddeus Jr. (2019) "The Consumer Healthcare Data Market: Redefining Healthcare Mergers
Through The Linked Consumer Retail Data and Health Insurance Markets," University of Baltimore Law
Forum: Vol. 50 : No. 1 , Article 4.
Available at: https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol50/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of
ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please contact hmorrell@ubalt.edu.

COMMENT
THE CONSUMER HEALTHCARE DATA MARKET: REDEFINING
HEALTHCARE MERGERS THROUGH THE LINKED CONSUMER
RETAIL DATA AND HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETS
By: Thaddeus Sheehy, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
Antitrust laws, as discussed hereunder, are used to prevent competitors
from merging when the newly-merged company would have a large enough
market share to enable it to charge monopoly pricing and exert their
monopoly power to control a competitive market.1 As an example, Amazon
and Google are not competitors and thus would not be heavily scrutinized
under the antitrust laws. However, the two corporations would never be
allowed to merge. But why? The answer is a simple one: data. Amazon and
Google are both in entirely different industries; however, they are also
competitors in the Consumer Data Market. The Consumer Data Market is
the process of companies acquiring personal data on consumers in order to
tailor and market products and services to consumers.2
However, within the broad Consumer Data Market, there can be welldefined submarkets.3 This paper will focus on the well-defined Consumer
Healthcare Data submarket, through an analysis of the Linked Health
Insurance and the Consumer Retail Data Markets. Specifically, this analysis
will address the well-defined submarket in U.S. v. Aetna, where the Medicare
Advantage Plan Market was recognized as a well-defined Health Insurance

*

Thaddeus C. Sheehy, Jr.: J.D. Candidate, 2019, University of Baltimore School of Law. I
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1
Sherman Anti-Trust Act 15 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq. (2004) [hereinafter “Sherman Act”]; Clayton
Act 15 U.S.C. § 12 et. seq. (2002) [hereinafter “Clayton Act”].
2
Meta S. Brown, When and Where to Buy Consumer Data (And 12 Companies Who Sell It),
FORBES (Sept. 30, 2015, 09:49 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/metabrown/2015/09/30/when-and-where-to-buy-consumerdata-and-12-companies-who-sell-it/#2d7ce0683285.
3
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (holding that within a broad market,
“well-defined submarkets may exist, which, in themselves, constitute product markets for
antitrust purposes”); see also FTC v. Staples, 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997).
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Market.4 In Dino Rikos, the Retail Sales Data Market was recognized as a
relevant market when denying certiorari for a class action certification.5
Finally, in WELLPOINT, the United States District Court for the Central
District of California recognized that a Data Market could be directly and
inextricably linked to a market to provide medical services (the “Consumer
Healthcare Data Market”).6
Generally, there are three types of mergers that occur in the healthcare
industry: vertical,7 horizontal,8 and conglomerate.9 A Linked Market exists
when, at the time of the merger, the companies are using the data from the
Consumer Retail Data Market to set the insurance rates in the Health
Insurance Market.10 Linked markets are generally hard to define and account
for, which does not fit the model of the antitrust laws that were written before
a digital market place.11
Since the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(“ACA”),12 there has been an increasing trend of retail companies engaging
mergers with healthcare companies. Examples of this include Amazon’s
acquisition of the online pharmacy, PillPack, or CVS Pharmacy’s acquisition
of the health insurance company, Aetna.13 However, the government did not
4

United States v. Aetna, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 1 (2017) (holding that Aetna and Humana
would not be allowed to merge due to the anti-competitive effects).
5
Rikos v. Procter & Gamble Co., No. 1:11-cv-226, 2014 WL 11370455 (S.D. Ohio June 19,
2014).
6
In re WELLPOINT, Inc. Out-of-Network “UCR” Rates Litig., 865 F.Supp.2d 1002 (2011)
(“The relevant product market is the market for data used to calculate UCRs (Usual,
Customary, and Reasonable rates) for reimbursements of claims by health insurance
beneficiaries for out-of-network, non-negotiated medical services (the ‘Data Market’). The
Data Market is directly and inextricably linked to the market for ONS (the ‘Linked ONS
Market’) in that the Data Market constitutes the primary input to the Linked ONS Market,
and the Insurer Conspirators use the Data Market to control and depress amounts reimbursed
in the Linked ONS Market.”).
7
Roger Wohlner, Mergers and Acquisitions: Definition, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/metabrown/2015/09/30/when-and-where-to-buy-consumerdata-and-12-companies-who-sell-it/#2d7ce0683285 (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (A vertical
merger is a merger between “a customer and company or a supplier and company. This of a
cone supplier merging with an ice cream maker.”).
8
Id. (A horizontal merger is a merger between “two companies that are in direct competition
and share the same product lines and markets.”).
9
Id. (A Conglomerate merger is a merger between “two companies that have no common
business areas.”).
10
In Re WELLPOINT, 865 F.Supp.2d 1002.
11
Id.
12
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010).
13
See Luke Lango, Amazon’s acquisition of PillPack is the Start of Something Big,
INVESTORPLACE (June 29, 2018, 10:03 AM),
https://investorplace.com/2018/06/amazons-acquisition-pillpack-start-something-big/;
Kenneth Yood, WHAT SAY YOU, NEW YORK? Now that Federal Antitrust Regulators Have
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challenge these mergers, which leads to a strong presumption that these
mergers were evaluated as conglomerate mergers. There are many procompetitive reasons for firms to engage in conglomerate mergers, such as
efficiency. However, with the advent of “Patient-Generated Health Data”
(“PGHD”),14 or data that is gathered by consumers from manual entries or
the use of health-related information from smartphones and other wearables,
access to a consumer’s data has become more valuable. According to a recent
complaint filed by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), PGHD is
considered health records data and demonstrates an attempt by the FTC to
regulate healthcare data.15
Included with PGHD is information about a consumer’s lifestyle choice.16
For instance, large retail consumer data market companies such as Amazon
can collect such information from the online purchases or grocery store
choices of their customers from their subsidiary, Whole Foods.17 The
purchase of Whole Foods enables Amazon to get more precise and focused
data than they are currently receiving from the use of their e-commerce
platform, as grocery store purchases are “habitual and frequent.”18 The depth
and breadth of access to data that Amazon, Walmart, and others in the Retail
Consumer Data Market have about consumers raises serious antitrust issues
that require careful analysis in order to protect consumers from monopolistic
effects.19 Due to these concerns, this paper will redefine the process for
evaluating mergers between companies in the healthcare and retail industries
Approved CVS’s Proposed Acquisition of Aetna, Attention Turns to New York State, NAT’L
L. REV. (Oct. 23, 2018),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/what-say-you-new-york-now-federal-antitrustregulators-have-approved-cvs-s-proposed; Carl O'Donnell and Greg Roumeliotis, Walmart
talking with Humana on closer ties; acquisition possible: sources, YAHOO FINANCE (Mar.
30, 2018),
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/walmart-talking-humana-closer-ties-000530657.html.
14
What are patient-generated health data?, HEALTH IT SECURITY (Jan. 19, 2018),
https://www.healthit.gov/topic/otherhot-topics/what-are-patient-generated-health-data.
15
Jessica Davis, Facebook Accused of Exposing User Health Data in Complaint to FTC,
HEALTH IT SECURITY (Feb. 20, 2019),
https://healthitsecurity.com/news/facebook-accused-of-exposing-user-health-data-in-ftccomplaint.
16
Id.
17
Greg Petro, Amazon’s Acquisition Of Whole Foods Is About Two Things: Data and
Product, FORBES (Aug. 2, 2017, 12:13 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/gregpetro/2017/08/02/amazons-acquisition-of-whole-foodsis-about-two-things-data-and-product/#277640eaa808.
18
Id.
19
Terrell McSweeny & Brian O’Dea, Data, Innovation, and Potential Competition in Digital
Markets – Looking Beyond Short-Term Price Effects in Merger Analysis, FTC (Feb. 2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1321373/cpi-mcsweenyodea.pdf.
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by including an analysis of the direct and inextricable link in the Consumer
Healthcare Data Market. Specifically, this paper will demonstrate the “link”
between the Retail Sales Data and Insurance Markets through the anticompetitive effects of the potential merger between Walmart and Humana.
To understand how mergers are evaluated, Section I will discuss the
background of antitrust law concerning mergers through the Twelve-Step
Rule of Reason merger analysis. Section II will conduct a full Twelve-Step
Rule of Reason merger analysis on the potential merger between Walmart
and Humana and the threat this potential merger poses to consumers. Section
III will propose stricter enforcement of the antitrust laws for mergers that
affect Maryland and increased regulations on how companies are allowed to
use the personal data of consumers.
I. BACKGROUND
When Congress passed the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890 (“Sherman
Act”),20 the intent was a “comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed
at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.”21 The
Sherman Act and Clayton Act ensure that competition22 is protected by
precluding contracts or combinations that “unreasonably” restrain
competition.23 Together, these acts represent an effort by Congress to
provide a reasonable curb to the confessed industrial and commercial abuses
of the time as greed for profit ran wild.24 With time the court developed a
better understanding of the economic effects of corporations and evaluated
whether a merger would unreasonably restrain trade by conducting an
economic analysis of the relevant market.25 The FTC’s 2010 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines (“2010 Guidelines”)26 that regulate acquisitions and

20

Sherman Anti-Trust Act 15 U.S.C. §1 et seq.; Clayton Act 15 U.S.C. §12 et. seq.
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
22
Chelsea Levinson, Types of Competition in Economics, BIZFLUENT (June 08, 2018),
https://bizfluent.com/info-7904519-types-competition-economics.html (competition is
present in a market when there are a number of companies providing a product or service in
the same market. When there is not sufficient competition in a market, a monopoly is present
and leads to increased costs for consumers).
23
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 90 (1911); Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1918).
24
Charles Nagel, The Origin and Purpose of the Sherman Act, 15 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 313,
318-19 (1930),
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol15/iss4/1.
25
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 592 (1957).
26
U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, FTC (2010),
available at http://ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf. [hereinafter, 2010 Guidelines].
21
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mergers (“mergers”) are subject to section 1 of the Sherman Act27 and section
7 of the Clayton Act.28 In order to demonstrate antitrust violations that would
occur as the result of a proposed merger, the court requires the presence of
several different factors.29
First, courts must determine the relevant product market (the “line of
commerce”).30 Second, the courts must determine the relevant geographic
market.31 After defining both relevant markets, courts will be able to
establish whether a merger is considered vertical, horizontal, or
conglomerate.32 A vertical merger is a merger between a customer and a
company or a supplier and a company,33 whereas a horizontal merger is a
merger between two companies that are in direct competition and share the
same product lines and markets,34 and a conglomerate merger is a merger
between two companies that have no common business areas.35 If the
Consumer Healthcare Data Market were considered a horizontal market that
can be used to affect the healthcare and pricing decisions for Marylanders,
courts apply the “Rule of Reason” analysis.36
The “Rule of Reason” analysis compares the pro-competitive and anticompetitive effects on the relevant product and geographic market at issue.37
There are a number of ways that a court can analyze a potential merger, but
where the anti-competitive effects are not intuitively obvious, the TwelveStep Rule of Reason analysis needs to be conducted.38 The method that this
analysis will focus on is the more detailed twelve-step merger analysis
because the Consumer Healthcare Data Market is a new way to look at

27

Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 1 et. seq., (mergers subject to § 1 are prohibited if they constitute
a “contract, combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade . . . “); see also 2010
Guidelines, supra note 26, § 5.3, at 18-19.
28
Clayton Act § 12 et. seq., (mergers subject to § 7 are prohibited if their effect “may be
substantially to lessen completion, or to tend to create a monopoly.”); see also 2010
Guidelines, supra note 26, § 5.3, at 18-19.
29
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 1, at 1.
30
du Pont, 353 U.S. at 589.
31
United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371-72 (1963) (holding that merging
companies with greater than thirty percent market share cannot merge and that merging
companies cannot counterbalance pro-competitive effects in one market with anticompetitive effects in another market).
32
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 4, at 7.
33
Mitchell Grant & Will Kenton, Horizontal Merger: INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/horizontalmerger.asp (last visited Sept. 24, 2019).
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Standard Oil, supra note 23.
37
Id.
38
FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720 (D.D.C. 2001); see also California Dental Ass’n
v. FTC, 119 S.Ct. 1604, 1606 (1999).
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mergers between the Consumer Retail Data and Health Insurance Markets.
The Twelve-Step Rule of Reason merger analysis is:
(1) product market definition; (2) geographic market
definition; (3) number of market participants and relative
market share; (4) market concentration; (5) unilateral effects
with a corporation’s ability to raise prices, decrease quality or
variety of offerings, or raise a rival’s costs; (6) potential for
coordinated effects – such as collusion; (7) powerful buyers in
the market; (8) ease of entry into the relevant market; (9)
efficiencies in allowing the merger; (10) is there a failing
company or division; (11) is this a merger of competing
buyers; (12) or would this be considered a partial
acquisition.39
The Twelve-Step Rule of Reason merger analysis contains several tests and
methods in each step to determine the impact(s) a merger may have on
consumers and competition.40
However, the Twelve-Step Rule of Reason analysis relies on a traditional
price-based model for merger analysis that may not be effective in showing
the anti-competitive effects.41 This approach may not be effective because it
is common for there to be two-sided markets where consumers provide
information on themselves for “free” in one market, and where the
information is used in a second market to charge for products or services.42
Data is a competitive asset for a corporation, and some argue that data
aggregation is not an issue because it does not prevent competitors from
simultaneously using that data.43 However, data with a competitive
significance may be hard to obtain, and companies possessing that data will
have little incentive to share.44 Additionally, innovation in a merger may
include a non-price dimension of current competition, such as the ability for
companies to gather, store, and process PGHD.45 Although the Rule of
Reason analysis may not be effective in fully demonstrating the anti-

39

2010 Guidelines, supra note 26; see also The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of
Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, Department of Justice, available
at:
https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/merger-guidelines-and-integration-efficienciesantitrust-review-horizontal-mergers (last visited November 25, 2019)(explaining the
integration of the Rule of Reason analysis into the Horizontal Merger Guidelines over time).
40
Id.
41
McSweeny & O’Dea, supra note 19, at 2.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.; see also 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, at 2.
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competitive effects, until the FTC changes its guidelines, it is the best and
only tool provided for antitrust analysis.46
Since the issue of the anti-competitive effects from data has been plaguing
our country, the FTC has created a new Technology Task Force (“Task
Force”).47 The mandate of the Task Force includes reviewing mergers that
have already been approved and challenging new mergers that could have
anti-competitive effects.48 However, the Task Force does not currently have
a plan to change the 2010 Guidelines related to the technology sector.49 Since
the anti-competitive effects of the potential merger between Walmart and
Humana are not intuitively obvious because the market is new and difficult
to understand, the Twelve-Step Rule of Reason analysis is required to
evaluate this potential merger.50
II. ISSUE
A. How the Consumer Healthcare Data Market can and has been used to
set Health Insurers to Insurance Prices
The broad Consumer Data Market is essentially an abstract portrait of who
an individual is, and more importantly whom an individual is when compared
to other people.51 Consumer data can be used to compromise individuals
because companies are building models or avatars of individuals in the cloud
and showing hundreds of thousands of videos to this avatar to see what
advertising messaging is effective.52 The purpose of companies doing this
practice is to create a persuasion and prediction tool for consumers, and the
Consumer Data Market is just in its infancy.53 In years past, advertisers paid
companies a cost per thousand views (“CPM”) for a marketing campaign, but
today companies in the Consumer Data Market are paid on a cost per action
(“CPA”).54 The data a company acquires about consumers consists of
46

2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 6.2, at 22.
John McKinnon, FTC’s New Task Force Could Be Trouble for Big Tech, WALL STREET J.
(Feb. 28, 2019, 7:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ftcs-new-task-force-could-betrouble-for-big-tech-11551357000; see also Frank Bajak, Top antitrust enforcer warns Big
Tech over data collection, Newstimes (Nov. 8, 2019) ("Antitrust enforcers cannot turn a
blind eye to the serious competition questions that digital markets have raised").
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
California Dental Ass’n, 119 S.Ct. at 1606.
51
Jacob Ward, Why data, not privacy, is the real danger, NBC NEWS (Feb. 4, 2019, 2:49
PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/why-data-not-privacy-realdanger-n966621.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
47
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intimate personal details (e.g. race or sexual orientation_ derived from their
behavioral history and not the result of consumer disclosure to the company.55
While it would be difficult to show the effect of data in our personal lives,
the value of an individual’s data, when combined with everyone else’s data,
is priceless, even without companies having access to healthcare data.56
For an example of how valuable and impactful it would be for a company
to have access to data in healthcare, think of the data that Amazon and
Walmart have on their consumers. These companies know what consumers
purchased, what products they did not purchase, the location of the
consumers, and which advertisements were effective on those consumers.
Now, imagine that one of these companies has a consumer that regularly
purchases soft drinks and junk food and is a customer for that company’s
healthcare business. Currently, health insurers are gathering lifestyle data on
consumers to link patients’ medical outcomes and costs to the details of their
personal lives, like their level of education, net worth, retail purchases, family
structure, and race.57 The implication of this is a future where everything an
individual does, purchases, eats, and time they spend watching television is
used to determine how much that individual pays for health insurance.58 That
future, according to a research scientist from an unnamed insurance company,
is today.59
In WELLPOINT, the data used to set consumers’ rates for both out-ofnetwork healthcare services and the Insurance Market were considered
“Linked Markets.”60 A “Linked Market” can also be demonstrated in the
Consumer Retail Data Market and the Medicare Advantage Plan Market,
collectively, the Consumer Healthcare Data Market. Humana is one of the
four largest companies to provide Medicare Advantage Plans to customers in
Maryland.61 Additionally, an estimated 95% of all consumers shopped at
Walmart in 2016.62 While this is not an exact figure for Walmart’s market
55

Id.
Id.
57
Marshall Allen, Health Insurers Are Vacuuming Up Details About You – And It Could
Raise
Your
Rates,
PROPUBLICA
(July
17,
2018,
5:00
AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/health-insurers-are-vacuuming-up-details-about-youand-it-could-raise-your-rates.
58
Id.
59
Id. (When asked if customer data is used to set prices, “a research scientist from one
company told (Allen): ‘I can’t say it hasn’t happened.’”).
60
In Re WELLPOINT, 865 F. Supp. 2d at 1029-31.
61
Continued Enrollment Growth in Employer-Group Medicare Advantage, MARK FARRAH
ASSOCIATES (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.markfarrah.com/mfa-briefs/continuedenrollment-growth-in-employer-group-medicare-advantage/.
62
Krystina Gustafson, Nearly every American spent money at Wal-Mart last year, CNBC
NEWS (Apr. 12, 2017, 9:58 AM),
56
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share, it is the type of data that is difficult and costly to obtain that may
operate as a barrier to entry for potential new entrants, or new competitive
companies, in the Consumer Healthcare Data Market that raises anticompetitive concerns.63
In Maryland, there are approximately 107,000 Medicare Advantage Plan
patients.64 These patients represent approximately 36% of Maryland’s total
Medicare Beneficiaries in 2019, which is an 11.5% increase in the total
Medicare Beneficiaries from 2018.65 Humana has approximately 14% of the
total Medicare Advantage customers in Maryland.66 Additionally, Humana’s
Medicare Advantage Plan is available to 91% of beneficiaries nationally.67
Further, Humana added more seniors to its individual Medicare Advantage
plans than any of its rivals between 2013 and 2016.68
Because of Humana’s prominence, the potential merger between Walmart
and Humana would create a significant risk of anti-competitive effects that
exist in Linked Markets.69 The risk for anti-competitive effects is heighted
by the current practice of insurance companies using consumer retail data to
set rates for insurers.70 Finally, since insurance companies are seeking to use
the consumer data to set insurance premiums, Marylanders are at risk of
Walmart and Humana gaining a sole monopoly position in the Consumer
Healthcare Data Market.71 Walmart would be able to accomplish this through
the use of its sixty retail stores in Maryland.72 This next section will apply the
Twelve-Step Rule of Reason merger analysis to the potential merger between
Walmart and Humana.

https://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/12/nearly-every-american-spent-money-at-wal-mart-lastyear.html.
63
McSweeny, supra note 19, at 7.
64
Medicare
Advantage
in
Maryland,
MEDICARE
ADVANTAGE.COM,
https://www.medicareadvantage.com/plans-by-state/maryland (last visited June 30, 2019).
65
Medicare Advantage premiums continue to decline while plan choices and benefits
increase in 2019, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES (Sept. 28, 2018),
https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-releases/medicare-advantage-premiums-continuedecline-while-plan-choices-and-benefits-increase-2019 (This is an estimated figure based on
the total national numbers).
66
Continued Enrollment Growth in Employer-Group Medicare Advantage, supra note 61.
67
Aetna, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 10.
68
Id.
69
In Re WELLPOINT, 865 F. Supp. 2d at 1002.
70
Allen, supra note 57, at 3.
71
Dana Mattioli, et al., Walmart in Early-Stage Acquisition Talks With Humana, WALL
STREET J. (Mar. 29, 2018, 8:02 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/walmart-in-early-stageacquisition-talks-with-humana-1522365618.
72
Walmart Location Facts, Maryland, WALMART (last updated Feb. 1, 2019),
https://corporate.walmart.com/our-story/locations/united-states/maryland#/unitedstates/maryland.
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B. Application of the Twelve-Step Rule of Reason Analysis for the Potential
Walmart-Humana Merger
1. (1) Defining the Relevant Product and (2) Geographic Markets
The most important and debated part of this analysis is the relevant
product and the relevant geographic market definitions.73 If the merger is not
in the same market, or well-defined submarket,74 it would either not have
enough concentration or would not otherwise be subject to the strict
horizontal merger analysis.75 The geographic market’s scope generally
depends on transportation costs, but may also include language, regulations,
tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, custom and familiarity, reputation, and
service availability which may impede long-distance or international
transactions.76 For the purpose of the analysis of the immediate issue, the
relevant geographic market will be Maryland.77
Defining the relevant product and geographic markets is the most
important and divisive step of the merger analysis process.78 The FTC’s 2010
Guidelines provide two critical tools used to define the effects of a merger in
the relevant product markets: the “hypothetical monopolist test” and the
“Small but Significant but Non-Transitory Increase in Price” (“SSNIP”)
benchmark.79 Together, both tests are used to define both the relevant
product and geographic markets, which form the basis for any antitrust
analysis.
The “hypothetical monopolist test” is used to identify a set of products
that are reasonably interchangeable with a product sold by one of the merging
firms.80 This test requires that a product market “contain enough substitute
products so that it could be subject to post-merger exercise of market power

73

Arthur N. Lerner, Mergers: Antitrust Issues for Hospitals and Health Plans, AM. HEALTH
LAW.’S ASS’N, at 6, 16 (June 30 – July 2, 2008),
https://www.crowell.com/documents/Mergers_Antitrust-Issues-for-Hospitals-and-HealthPlans_Lerner.pdf.
74
F.T.C. v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1075 (D.D.C. 1997); see also Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325–26, 82 S. Ct. 1502, 1524, 8 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1962).
75
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 1, at 1.
76
Id.; see also United States v. Phila. Nat‘l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363, 83 S. Ct. 1715, 1741,
10 L. Ed. 2d 915 (1963).
77
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26 (“The arena of competition affected by the merger may be
geographically bounded if geography limits some customers’ willingness or ability to
substitute some products, or some suppliers’ willingness or ability to serve some customers.
Both supplier and customer locations can affect this.”).
78
Lerner, supra note 73.
79
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 4.1.1, at 9.
80
Id. §4.1, at 9.
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significantly exceeding that existing absent the merger.”81 The specific
requirement is that a “hypothetical profit-maximizing firm, not subject to
price regulation, that was the only present and future seller of those products
(“hypothetical monopolist”) likely would impose at least… [SSNIP] on at
least one product in the market, including at least one product sold by one of
the merging firms.”82 The application of the SSNIP test involves
interviewing consumers regarding buying decisions and determining whether
a hypothetical monopolist could profit from a price increase of five percent
for at least one year.83
When conducting a SSNIP test, all terms of sale of products outside of
Maryland are held constant.84 The SSNIP test is only a tool for the
hypothetical monopolist test; it is not designed as a tolerance level for price
increases resulting from the merger.85 The SSNIP test in effect is defining
the cross-elasticity of demand – a measurement to the responsiveness in the
quantity demanded of one good when the price for another changes.86 The
hypothetical monopolist test may also include products that are not in the
relevant market, so long as a customer would substitute with those products
in response to a price increase.87
In Aetna, a SSNIP test concluded that individual Medicare Advantage
plans constituted a relevant product market.88 The SSNIP test imposed a
SNNIP of 5% and 10%, and the Medicare Advantage Plan Market passed the
hypothetical monopolist test for the majority of the 364 counties in the
complaint.89 While this is not an exact figure, because of the challenge
involved in surveying thousands of Maryland Medicare Advantage Plan
customers, it provides a useful guide of Humana’s hypothetical monopolist
position.90
However, for companies like Walmart, the SSNIP test will need to be
conducted for a number of different product markets because the data could
be used in various well-defined submarkets.91 The product variances
between Walmart and one of its competitors provides a practical application
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Id.
Id.
83
Id. at 10.
84
Id.
85
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, §4.1, at 9.
86
Will Kenton, Cross Elasticity of Demand, INVESTOPEDIA, (last updated July 22, 2018),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cross-elasticity-demand.asp.
87
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 4.1, at 9.
88
Aetna, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 35.
89
Id. at 36.
90
Id.
91
See generally Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. 294.
82

2019]

The Consumer Healthcare Data Market

39

of the SSNIP test.92 As an example, Walmart’s flu shot is “Product A,” and
its competitor’s flu shot is “Product B.” Each flu shot sells for $100, has an
incremental cost of $60, and each company sells 1,200 units.93 For every
dollar increase in Product A with any given price for Product B, Product A
loses twenty units of sales to products outside of this candidate market.94 Ten
units would also be lost to Product B.95 Likewise, if the same price increase
occurred with Product B, then ten units would be lost to Product A.96
Economic analysis of this result demonstrates that Walmart and its
competitor would raise their prices to $110 and satisfy a SSNIP test of up to
10%.97 This is true despite the fact that two-thirds of the sales lost by one
product are diverted to products outside of the relevant market with a price
increase.98 A SSNIP test of up to 10% means that Walmart would be able to
charge monopoly pricing for its flu shots and competition would not likely
be timely, sufficient, or likely to prohibit the anti-competitive effects.99
Additionally, when reviewing a merger, part of the review of the effects
is to ensure that a merging company is not going to use its monopoly power
in one market to gain monopoly power in another market.100 For example,
Walmart cannot use its monopoly power in retail sales market to gain
monopoly power in the pharmaceutical market by providing a discount to
Humana’s Medicare Advantage Plan customers.
2. Determining the (3) Market Participants,101 Market Shares,102 and (4)
Concentration in the Relevant Product and Geographic Markets
There are two primary ways that courts determine the relative product
market concentration. In the FTC’s 1968 Horizontal Merger Guidelines
92

Flu Shots & Immunizations, WALMART,
https://www.walmart.com/cp/Immunizations-Flu-Shots/1228302
(last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
93
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 4.1, at 9.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 4.1, at 9.
100
Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321.
101
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 5.1 (explaining that market participants includes all
firms currently earning revenue in the relevant market and firms that are not currently
producing in the relevant market but would very likely provide rapid supply responses with
a direct competitive impact in the event of a SSNIP, without incurring significant sunk costs).
102
Id. § 5.2, at 16 (explaining that market shares are normally calculated with shares of all
firms that currently produce products in the relevant market, provided that this data is
available).
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(“1968 Guidelines”), the FTC used the Four-Firm Concentration Ratio
(“CR4”).103 The CR4 is the sum of the largest four firms in the market shares,
and if the merging firms are greater than thirty percent, the merger will not
be permitted.104
In the FTC’s 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“1982 Guidelines”), the
FTC still used the CR4, but included a new measure of geographic market
share105: the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”).106 However, in the
FTC’s 2010 Guidelines, the FTC abandoned the CR4 approach for the HHI
approach to determine the target company’s geographic market share.107
While the 2010 Guidelines abandoned the use of the CR4 approach, it is still
a useful tool used by the courts to determine the target company’s product
market share because the HHI is not always the best indicator.108
The HHI consists of the sums of the squares of all market participants’
shares in the market before and after the merger based on the relative size of
all firms.109 The advantage of the HHI approach is that it takes into account
every firm that participates in the market, rather than just the largest four
firms in a market place.110 “The HHI is calculated by taking the market share
103

Antitrust Div. Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 2, 16, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (1968)
[hereinafter “1968 Guidelines”],
http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11247.pdf.
104
Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 636-67 (holding that a merger with greater than thirty
percent may substantially lessen competition because the newly merged company would
have an undue percentage share of the relevant market. However, the merging companies
may be able to rebut the notion that thirty percent market share may substantially lessen
competition with a clear showing that the merger will not have this anti-competitive effect).
105
See sources cited infra note 105 (as an example, in Maryland, CVS may have 50% of the
prescription pharmacy revenue for consumers at home, while Walgreens has 20%, Grocery
Stores have 20%, and locally-owned pharmacies have the rest).
106
Antitrust Div. Horizontal Merger Guidelines § III.A at 12, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
(1982) [hereinafter, “1982 Guidelines”],
http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11248.pdf; see also U.S. Antitrust Div.’s Horizontal
Merger Guidelines § 3.10 at 8-9, 12-13, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (1984) [hereinafter “1984
Guidelines”],
http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11249.pdf.
107
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26 (The CR4 approach was abandoned because the HHI
approach was seen as being able to include more of the marketplace by counting all
companies in the relevant market, rather than just the largest four).
108
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 501-04 (1974) (holding that past
production and an HHI increase does not always predict future competitive effects. Despite
the proposed merger and increase in HHI, all of the coal in the merger in issue had already
been contracted and accounted for, so the increase in market concentration would not
enhance General Dynamic’s market power).
109
Adam Hayes, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index – HHI, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 29, 2018)
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hhi.asp.
110
See id. (Absent one of the largest four firms merging with a fifth firm that is not one of
those largest four firms).
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of each firm in the industry, squaring them, and summing the result” and can
range up to an HHI of 10,000.111 The HHI calculation results in a
proportionately greater weight given to larger firms, since they have a larger
market share than the smaller firms.112 When conducting an HHI calculation,
agencies such as the FTC, consider both the pre-merger level113 of the HHI
and the increase of HHI resulting from the merger.114 The increase in the
HHI level is equal to the squared sum of the merging firms and all other firms
in the market.115
The 2010 Guidelines do not provide strict rules116 to determine whether
the increase in the defined relevant markets will raise significant anticompetitive concerns; however, it has set forth general standards.117 The four
general standards for measuring an increase in market share are Small
Change in Concentration,118 Unconcentrated Markets,119 Moderately
Concentrated Markets,120 and Highly Concentrated Markets.121 However, the
presumption that the merger would lead to anti-competitive effects “may be
rebutted with persuasive evidence that the merger is unlikely to enhance
market power.”122 Additionally, the HHI calculation is more subject to error
111

See Hayes, supra note 108.
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 5.3, at 18.
113
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 5.3, at 18. (Noting that the pre-merger level of the
market is the current concentration of the market based on the HHI levels of all competitors
in the market prior to the merger commencing).
114
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 5.3, at 18.
115
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 5.3, at 18.
116
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 1 (Explaining that the FTC stated that the purpose of
the guidelines is to provide the business community and antitrust practitioners with the
analytical process of the FTC, as well as assisting courts in developing an appropriate
framework for interpreting and applying antitrust laws).
117
Id. § 5.3, at 19.
118
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 5.3, at 19 (“Mergers involving an increase in the HHI
of less than 100 points are unlikely to have adverse competitive effects and ordinarily require
no further analysis.”).
119
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 5.3, at 19 (“Mergers resulting in unconcentrated
markets are unlikely to have adverse competitive effects and ordinarily require no further
analysis.”).
120
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26 § 5.3, at 19 (“Mergers resulting in moderately
concentrated markets that involve an increase in the HHI of more than 100 points potentially
raise significant competitive concerns and often warrant scrutiny.”).
121
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26 § 5.3, at 19 (“Mergers resulting in highly concentrated
markets that involve an increase in the HHI of between 100 points and 200 points potentially
raise significant competitive concerns and often warrant scrutiny. Mergers resulting in highly
concentrated markets that involve an increase in the HHI of more than 200 points will be
presumed to be likely to enhance market power. The presumption may be rebutted by
persuasive evidence showing that the merger is unlikely to enhance market power.”).
122
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 5.3, at 19; see also United States v. General Dynamics
Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
112
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than the CR4 approach because if a firm’s percentage was 30%, but
incorrectly measured at 35%, then the CR4 would only be off by 5%.
However, application of the HHI calculation results in a 325 point increase.123
For this reason, both the CR4 and HHI are critical when evaluating the market
concentration in the relevant product and geographic markets.
In order to show the current market concentrations for the Consumer
Retail Data and Medicare Advantage Plan Markets, this analysis will used an
estimated CR4 and HHI approach.124 For Humana, the following data is
based on the 2017 national enrollment for Medicare Advantage Plans by the
company.125 The market shares are as follows: Company 1 is 24%, Humana
is 17%, Company 3 is 13%, Company 4 is 8%, Company 5 is 7%, Company
6 is 3%, Company 7 is 2%, Company 8 is 2%, and the remaining companies
are estimated at 1% each for the remaining 24% market share.126 Under the
CR4 approach, the merger would be presumed as anti-competitive if Humana
was able to increase its market share to 30% as a result of the merger.127 The
pre-merger HHI level is 1,188, or an unconcentrated market.128 Additionally,
under either approach, since Walmart does not currently sell health
insurance,129 the market shares show that there would not be an increase in
market share above a competitive level.
However, Walmart, in comparison, has a 95% market share in the
Consumer Retail Data Market.130 The 95% figure represents the estimated
percentage of consumers in the United States that shopped at Walmart in
2016.131 Walmart has the largest percentage of total United States retail
customers of any company in the United States.132 In the Matter of Reed
Elsevier, FTC’s consent decree stated that even though other firms could
possess this relevant data, other companies may not be able to compete
123

Calculated as 35% market concentration as 35^2 = 1,225 and 30% market concentration
as 30^2 = 900, and then subtracting the difference: 1,225 – 900 = 325.
124
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 5.3, at 18 (explaining that this figure will be estimated
because without the financial resources to be able to discover this information, it will be
difficult to provide exact figures).
125
Gretchen Jacobson, et al., Medicare Advantage 2017 Spotlight: Enrollment Market
Update, KFF (June 6, 2017), https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/medicare-advantage2017-spotlight-enrollment-market-update/.
126
Jacobson, supra note 124.
127
Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 364.
128
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 5.3, at 18 (HHI calculated as: 24^2 + 17^2 + 13^2 +
8^2 + 7^2+3^2 + 2^2 + 2^2 + 1^2*24 (representing the remaining 24% market share)
=1,188).
129
Walmart Inc., YAHOO! FINANCE, https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/WMT/profile (last
updated Oct. 4, 2019, 4:00PM).
130
Gustafson, supra note 62.
131
Gustafson, supra note 62.
132
Gustafson, supra note 62.
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effectively because of the combination of data and analytics capabilities.133
As a result of its data and analytics abilities,134 Walmart continues growing
in the online retail market with a projected sales increase of 35% in 2019.135
This is exactly the type of monopoly power that Walmart has in the Consumer
Retail Data Market that would lead to anti-competitive effects in the
Consumer Healthcare Data Market.136
Presently, however, there are no competitors in the Consumer Healthcare
Data Market.137 So through the CR4 approach, the resulting merger would
leave Walmart and Humana with essentially 100% market share. Under
Phila. Nat'l Bank, this would be far greater than the 30% benchmark for
courts to determine that the resulting merger would likely be anticompetitive.138 Similarly, with the HHI approach, the resulting merger would
lead to a concentration of 10,000 or a highly concentrated market.139 The
HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the pre-merger market share of
“0” and the post-merger market share of “100.”140 With companies using
information in the Consumer Retail Data Market in order to set health
insurance rates, the Consumer Healthcare Data Market represents a Linked
Market.141 Through either the CR4 or HHI approach, the decision in Alcoa
shows that the merger between Walmart and Humana would have a
monopoly and monopoly power that is illegal per se in the Consumer
Healthcare Data Market.142

133

McSweeny, supra note 19 (citing Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Order to
Aid Public Comment, In the Matter of Reed Elsevier and ChoicePoint, File No. 081-0133
(Sept. 16, 2008) at 2-3),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/fles/documents/cases/2008/09/080916reedelseviercpanal.
pdf.
134
Nandita Bose, Walmart seeks ad business boost in fight with Amazon, REUTERS (Feb. 26,
2019, 12:11 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-walmart-suppliers-advertisingidUSKCN1QF25M. (Discussing the ad growth Walmart anticipates by consolidating
advertising sales for its stores and websites).
135
Haris Anwar, Walmart, Target Have Cracked The Online Sales Code, With Impressive
Growth, INVESTING.COM (Mar. 7, 2019, 1:30 AM), https://www.investing.com/analysis/onebig-reason-to-buy-shares-of-walmart-and-target-200395056.
136
See McSweeny, supra note 19, at 4.
137
Mattioli, supra note 72.
138
Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 364.
139
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 5.3, at 18.
140
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 5, at 15.
141
Allen, supra note 57.
142
Gustafson, supra note 62. See 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 26, § 5; see
also United States v. Aluminum Co. of America et al., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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3. (5) Unilateral Effects with a Corporation’s Ability to Raise Prices,
Decrease Quality or Variety of Product Offerings, or to Raise a Rival’s Cost
When competition is eliminated between two firms competing in a
relevant market by way of a merger, the resulting unilateral effects may alone
substantially lessen competition.143 Mergers are evaluated by agencies and
courts to look at the effect that a merger will have on consumers in the
relevant market place.144 The Sherman Act represented an effort to provide
a reasonable curb to the confessed industrial and commercial abuses of the
time as greed for profit ran wild.145 A merging corporation’s ability to raise
prices, decrease quality or variety of product offerings, or raising a rival’s
costs are at the heart of antitrust enforcement.146
Companies that engage in consolidation in a relevant product and
geographic market are able to abuse their market power and raise prices
above the competitive level.147 According to a study by the Center for
American Progress, one of the ways that this is happening in the healthcare
industry is through healthcare provider consolidation.148 The ability to raise
prices through market power occurs in concentrated markets where a small
number of competitors control most of the sales and generally have higher
prices due to the lack of competition.149 The SSNIP test is used to
demonstrate incremental price increases.150 The SSNIP test provides a tool
to determine if a merging company can raise prices above the competitive
level in the relevant market based on all available substitutes.151 By
measuring this cross-elasticity of demand with the SSNIP test, agencies and
courts can determine if the merger will lead to increased pricing because of a
product with a low cross-elasticity of demand.152 However, as was seen in
143

2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 6, at 20.
Sherman Act, supra note 1 “comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at
preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.”.
145
Nagel, supra note 24.
146
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 6, at 20.
147
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 6, at 20.
148
Emily Gee & Ethan Gurwitz, Provider Consolidation Drives Up Health Care Costs,
AMERICAN PROGRESS, Dec. 5, 2018, 8:00 AM,
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/reports/2018/12/05/461780/providerconsolidation-drives-health-care-costs/.
149
Id.
150
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 4.1, at 9; see also infra Part II.B.i.
151
du Pont, 353 U.S. 586; see also Satellite Television & Associated Resources, Inc. v.
Cont‘l Cablevision of Va., Inc., 714 F.2d 351, 356 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied.
152
Will Kenton, Cross Elasticity of Demand, supra note 85; see also Staples, 970 F. Supp.
at 1078-79 (holding that there was a low cross-elasticity of demand between the potential
merging companies, Staples and Office Depot in comparison to other companies that sold
office goods, such as Walmart. The court reasoned that many of the consumers that went to
144
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du Pont, a SSNIP test could be an ineffective measurement because du Pont
was already a monopoly charging monopoly prices.153
When a merging company has the incentive to reduce product quality after
the merger is complete and independent of competitive responses from other
firms, the reduction in quality is considered an anti-competitive effect that
may substantially lessen competition.154 The effects of reducing the quality
or variety of product offerings may have a direct impact on consumers’ ability
to choose between products in a competitive market. As can be seen in Brown
Shoe,155 the unilateral effect of pricing occurs when raising rivals’ costs, just
as it would in raising the price of a merging company’s own goods because
of the detrimental effects to the consumer. In Brown Shoe, the effect of the
horizontal and vertical merging of the manufacturing and retail facilities
would have raised their rivals’ costs by forcing their competitors to create
more facilities to meet consumer demand.156 The result, if not stopped prior
to a merger occurring, is best seen in Aspen Skiing.157 In Aspen, three of the
four major ski resort areas in Aspen, Colorado, offered interchangeable lift
tickets and refused to let the fourth resort engage in this interchangeable ticket
when they had previously done so.158 By doing so, the monopolist effectively
decreased the variety of skiing options to consumers and raised their rival’s
costs because the fourth company was not able to benefit from the
interchangeable tickets.159
The unilateral effects are readily apparent in the Consumer Healthcare
Data Market, a differentiated market where some products are very close
substitutes and compete strongly with one another, while other products are

Staples or Office Depot for office supplies would not look to go to Walmart as an available
substitute).
153
du Pont, 353 U.S. 586; see also Aron & Burnstein, Regulatory Policy and the Reverse
Cellophane Fallacy (Dec. 4, 2010), J. OF COMPETITION LAW AND ECON., Vol. 6, Issue 4, pp.
973-994, 2010. Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1171292 (discussing that because du Pont already had a monopoly
and was charging monopoly pricing, the SSNIP test was not an adequate measure of raising
pricing at a competitive level in the marketplace).
154
FTC v. Swedish Match N. Am., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 2d 151, 173 (2000) (holding that the
merger should be enjoined because the FTC demonstrated a “reasonable probability” that the
merger may substantially lessen competition by reducing the quality and variety of the
offerings).
155
Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 324 (In Brown Shoe, the proposed merger was an integration of
both vertical and horizontal mergers for shoe manufacturing and retail).
156
Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 337-39.
157
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 589-91 (1985).
158
Id.
159
Id. at 609-610 (holding that there was no valid reason for discontinuing the participation
of the fourth ski resort in the interchangeable ticketing).
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substitutes that are more distant and are not as strong of competitors.160 As
an example, BMW and Lexus sedans compete with each other for consumers
more readily than either company does with a Dodge sedan. A merger
between companies selling differentiated products may unilaterally raise one
or both of the products above the pre-merger price and capture sales lost to
the other differentiated product. In Heinz, both potentially merging
companies were found to be selling in a differentiated “second-shelf” market
for Gerber baby foods.161 The post-merger ability to increase pricing was
shown to likely substantially lessen competition because they were the only
two companies selling in this “second-shelf” market by raising prices on
those products against Gerber, who did not effectively compete with either
company.162 An example of Walmart and Humana’s ability to unilaterally
affect the market would be that the merger would result in forcing rivals in
the Health Insurance Market to gain access to more consumer data in order
to compete with the newly-merged company.
4. (6) Potential for Coordinated Effects
Mergers may enable or encourage post-merger coordinated effects, or
collusion between firms in the relevant market that diminishes competition
and ultimately harms consumers.163 The reason this is analyzed and
prohibited is that “collusion typically leads to monopoly-like outcomes,
including monopoly profits that are shared by the colluding parties.”164 Firms
involved in collusion are generally referred to as “cartels” when looking to
harm consumers in the relevant market.165 The simple way of thinking about
this from a merger perspective is that when fewer firms are competing in a
relevant market, collusion becomes easier. There are three types of collusion
that can occur after a merger: Type I involves collective action to raise price

160

2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 6.1, at 20-1.
Heinz, 246 F.3d at 718 (A “second-shelf” market occurs when there is one dominate
company in the relevant market, while other companies are competing for the “second spot
on the shelf.” As an example, in Maryland, Old Bay is known to have a monopoly on crab
seasoning, while other companies compete for the “second-shelf” market).
162
Id.
163
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 7, at 24. (“Coordinated interaction involves conduct by
multiple firms that is profitable for each of them only as a result of the accommodating
reactions of the others.”).
164
Robert H. Lande & Howard P. Marvel, The Three Types of Collusion: Fixing Prices,
Rivals, and Rules, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 941 (2000).
165
Id.; see also 2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 7, at 24. Collusion (“involves conduct by
multiple firms that is profitable for each of them only as a result of the accommodating
reactions of the others.”).
161
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directly;166 Type II involves disadvantaging rivals in a manner that causes the
rivals output to diminish or causes their behavior to become chastened;167 and
Type III involves firms fixing the rules of competition in the relevant
market.168
However, the ability of rival firms to engage in any type of collusion can
depend on the market concentration and strength as well as the predictability
of the rival firms in the market to respond to price or other competitive
initiatives.169 Additionally, when firms merge, it can increase market
concentration to enable firms to strengthen their positions and to create more
incentives for other firms in the market to act in a coordinated or collusive
manner.170 When looking at a merger, agencies are likely to challenge a
merger if: “(1) the merger would significantly increase concentration and lead
to a moderately or highly concentrated market; (2) the market shows signs of
vulnerability to coordinated conduct;171 and (3) the agencies have a credible
basis on which to conclude that the merger may enhance that
vulnerability.”172
As an example, if Walmart and Humana were allowed to merge, the
merger would result in a monopoly in the Consumer Healthcare Data
Market.173 If another company entered the Consumer Healthcare Data
Market, Walmart might have an incentive to collude, either explicitly or
implicitly, with other firms. The incentive occurs when it allows Walmart
and Humana to maintain its monopoly position and charge monopoly
166
Lande, supra note 163 “The monopoly outcome arises as the cartel members agree either
to restrict output (such as OPEC), to raise prices, or to divide markets”; See also du Pont,
supra note 25 where the FTC was unsuccessful in challenging this type of practice.
167
Id. (explaining that there is type of collusion “consists of agreements to take action jointly
to harm rivals that are not party to the collusion”); see also N.W. Wholesale Stationers, Inc.
v. Pac. Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985) (holding that a purchasing cooperative’s joint effort to coerce suppliers and customers to deny a relationship that
competitors needed was an illegal way to disadvantage a rival).
168
Id. Type III collusion “includes instances of collusion that are often subtle and complex.
Most examples of collusion to manipulate the rules of competition have arisen in industries
with heterogeneous products, or in industries where it would be extremely difficult for a
classic cartel to monitor prices or to detect firms that deviate from agreed-upon prices.”; see
also Calif. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n., 224 F.3d 942, 943 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding
that the association’s refusal to release X-rays from patients to insurers was a rule-making
collusion that was per se illegal and similar to a refusal to compete on price that harmed
consumers with higher insurance premiums.)
169
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 7, at 24.
170
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 7, at 25.
171
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 7, at 25. (The market would show signs to vulnerability
if there had been a history of collusion in the relevant market or failed attempts for collusive
conduct in another geographic or product market).
172
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 7.1, at 25.
173
Allen, supra note 57.
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pricing.174 Additionally, as collusion relates to data, companies can easily
share data, which is a practice that major companies have been under
increased scrutiny for, such as Facebook.175 Therefore, if Walmart and
Humana were permitted to merge, there would be a strong potential for
coordinated effects in the market.
5. (7) Powerful Buyers
Powerful buyers generally can negotiate favorable terms and lower costs
based on the volume of business conducted, but the favorable terms can also
reflect price discrimination in their favor.176 When agencies review mergers,
they consider whether the presence of powerful buyers obviates the potential
for collusive activity.177 If the merger consists of a powerful buyer in the
marketplace, that buyer could also use their ability to negatively impact prices
based on their volume of purchases.178 As an example, Walmart is currently
contracting with six healthcare organizations nationwide to provide its health
plan-covered employees with no out-of-pocket costs for certain surgeries.179
Another example of this practice is Amazon selling online ads to a chain of
physical therapy centers with the intent of targeting customers who live near
these centers and had recently bought knee braces through Amazon.180
Walmart, after partnering with Google and Google Home, has the same
capability as Amazon’s Alexa to target consumers.181 If powerful buyers like
Walmart can enter the Consumer Healthcare Data Market with the amount
174

See generally Lande, supra note 163.
Matt Weinberger, Facebook is reportedly under criminal investigation over deals that
gave Apple, Amazon, and other companies access to user data, BUSINESS INSIDER, Mar. 13,
2019,
https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-criminal-investigation-data-sharing2019-3.
176
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 8, at 27.
177
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 8, at 27. (“This can occur, for example, if powerful
buyers have the ability and incentive to vertically integrate upstream or sponsor entry, or if
the conduct or presence of large buyers undermines coordinated effects.”).
178
2010 Guidelines, supra note 26, § 8, at 27. (“Agencies do not presume that the presence
of powerful buyers alone forestalls adverse competitive effects flowing from a merger.”).
179
Chris Anderson, Wal-Mart Emphasizes Outcomes, Value in Centers of Excellence
Program, HEALTHCARE FINANCE NEWS, Oct. 12, 2012,
https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/walmart-emphasizes-outcomes-valuecenters-excellence-program.
180
Karen Weise, Amazon Knows What You Buy. And It’s Building a Big Ad Business From
It, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 20, 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/20/technology/amazon-ads-advertising.html.
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Daisuke Wakanayashi & Michael Corkery, Google and Walmart Partner With Eye on
Amazon, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/23/technology/google-walmart-e-commercepartnership.html.
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and sophistication of the data that they have on their consumers, they become
a threat to the competitive market.
6. (8) Entry into the Relevant Market
When analyzing entry into the market, a reviewing agency will look at
pre-existing plans that are induced by the merger.182 The agency will
consider the entry sufficient to alleviate any anti-competitive concern if entry
into the relevant market is deemed “easy.” 183 Entry into a relevant market is
considered easy when such entry is “timely, likely, and sufficient in its
magnitude, character, and scope to deter or counteract the competitive effects
of concern.”184 When evaluating timeliness, the entrance must be rapid
enough to deter a potential monopolist from charging monopoly pricing,
making it unprofitable because the new entrant to the market would, in
theory, lower prices in order to take away market share from their rivals in
the industry.185 An entrant is likely to the relevant market if it is profitable
for a firm to sell goods into that market.186
In Heinz, a new entrant to the market was not likely because of the barriers
to entry, including economies of scale, high fees for getting the product into
stores, lack of brand recognition, and lack of trust of the firms in the
market.187 However, even if an entry were to be both timely and likely, it
may not be sufficient to counteract the anti-competitive effects.188 For
example, a new entrant into the healthcare market will likely not be a
monopolist if that entrant is not able to provide targeted ads for potential new
consumers based on their location services, a technique that Amazon
employs.189 The issue with the Consumer Healthcare Data Market is exactly
the type of “valuable intangible asset, which may be difficult or time
182
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consuming for an entrant to replicate,” which would make an entry into the
market unlikely to counteract the anti-competitive effects of a merger.190
Companies would now have to acquire data on 95% of American consumers
in order to remain competitive.191
7. (9) Efficiencies of the Merger; (10) Failing Companies or Divisions; (11)
Mergers of Competing Buyers; and (12) Partial Acquisitions
When a company is charged with a merger that is perceived as anticompetitive, it may be able to combat that perception through an efficiency
or failing company or division defense.192 However, any efficiencies gained
during a merger must be merger-specific.193 An efficiency is considered to
be merger-specific when the merging companies can demonstrate to a court
that the efficiency would not be possible unless the companies were allowed
to merge.194 Walmart and Humana would likely be able to claim a number
of efficiencies that would result from the merger, such as using Walmart to
provide Humana with the largest information technology infrastructure of
any company in the world.195 Walmart would also be able to create a true
one-stop-shop for customers through its stores and the healthcare clinics that
Walmart is constructing.196 Another efficiency the companies would be able
to claim is that Humana customers would have the advantage with Walmart
to negotiate rates for healthcare services, as they are doing now.197
However, as the decision in Brown Shoe demonstrates, claiming an
efficiency defense can be difficult to prove.198 In Brown Shoe, a case
involving a horizontal and vertical merger, the efficiencies came from being
able to integrate manufacturing and retail facilities.199 However, the
government met its burden of proof in showing that these integrated facilities
had a tendency toward concentration in the market that would result in anticompetitive effects.200 Similarly, in Heinz, the merger would have resulted
in efficiencies such as economies of scale with manufacturing, better
190
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manufacturing processes, and better product formulas.201 In Heinz, the
merger was stopped because the efficiencies were not merger-specific, or in
other words, could have been achieved by means other than through the
merger.202
As in Heinz, the Walmart-Humana merger could likely achieve many of
the potential efficiencies by other means, such as increased research and
development for a better technology infrastructure.203 Therefore, the merger
should not be permitted on an efficiency basis because the efficiencies gained
in the Walmart-Humana merger are not merger-specific.
A company needs to demonstrate to a court that absent a merger, the
company or division would fail in order to assert the failing company or
division defense.204 Specifically, to demonstrate the failing company or
division defense, a company shows that there is a grave probability that the
business or division will fail,205 and a failing company or division must show
that it attempted to search for a less anti-competitive purchaser.206 However,
neither company is likely to raise this defense as both Walmart and Humana
have strong earnings.207
Mergers of competing buyers, just like mergers of competing sellers, can
enhance market power and lead to anti-competitive effects.208 The market
power of powerful buyers is sometimes referred to as “monopsony power”
leading to “monoposonization” violations.209 In evaluating monopsony
concerns, the essential elements of monoposonization violations are the
mirror image of the elements of monopolization.210 Thus, the merger of
competing buyers is likely to lessen competition in a manner that is harmful
to sellers and, ultimately, consumers in a relevant market.211
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Finally, the agencies also review acquisitions of minority positions
involving competing firms, even if those minority positions do not
necessarily eliminate competition between the parties to the transaction.212 If
an agency determines that the partial acquisition will result in effective
control of or involve substantially all of the assets of the target firm, the
partial acquisition will be analyzed just like a merger.213 As an example, if
Walmart partially acquired a substantial portion of shares in Walgreens, it
may be able to influence the competitive conduct of Walgreens. Walmart
could influence the competitive conduct of Walgreens through a voting
interest that may give Walmart the power to appoint members to the board of
directors. This acquisition of a minority position could directly impact
Walgreens’ competitive conduct, reduce the incentive of Walmart to compete
with Walgreens,214 or give Walmart access to competitively sensitive
information from Walgreens.215 In conclusion, the Twelve-Part Rule of
Reason analysis applied to Walmart and Humana means that the hypothetical
resulting merger would be anti-competitive and in violation of the Sherman
and Clayton Acts.
III. SOLUTION
A. The Need for Stricter State and Federal Enforcement
Maryland’s Attorney General has concurrent authority with the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and FTC under the Sherman and Clayton Acts
to prevent mergers between companies in the Consumer Retail Data and
Health Insurance Markets that unreasonably restrain trade.216 As such,
Maryland’s Attorney General, the DOJ, and the FTC should take a new
approach in analyzing mergers to prevent companies like Amazon and
Walmart from gaining a foothold in the healthcare industry. The issue with
new companies entering the Consumer Data Market is that “companies are
not successful because they have a lot of data, they have a lot of data because
212
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they’re successful.”217 Data is essentially the source of a company’s
intellectual capital, and to punish companies for it would be tantamount to
discouraging success.218
Discouraging competition is against the basic principles of antitrust law in
the United States,219 but companies still cannot use their monopoly power in
one market to gain monopoly power in another.220 Even if the Consumer
Healthcare Data Market was considered a “new market” for antitrust
enforcement, the principles of preserving free and unfettered competition
remain the same.221 In U.S. v. Microsoft, the technology company was
accused of abusing its monopoly power by integrating and bundling its
operating services with its web browser software.222 This would result in
Microsoft having a monopoly in the web browser market in addition to its
monopoly in the operating services market. However, the case was ultimately
settled after the DOJ decided not to seek the break up of Microsoft, but rather
to allow personal computer manufacturers to adopt non-Microsoft
software.223 The Microsoft case is a prime example of an enforcement action
against a company in a new market that was using its intellectual property,
similar to the way data is used in the Consumer Data Market, to exercise its
monopoly power.224
To ensure success while bringing suit under the Sherman Act or FTC Act
against potential monopolists in the Consumer Healthcare Data Market is
through a detailed product definition.225 By narrowly defining the product
market, the market shares of the merging parties is often a prima facie
showing of a violation of the antitrust laws.226 For example, in Staples, the
FTC was able to convince a U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia,
that office supply stores were a completely separate market from other
companies selling identical office supplies.227 This case shows that through
a narrow definition of the product market, it is not relevant that other
217
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companies are providing similar products or services to consumers. On the
other hand, when the relevant market is too broadly defined, it is unlikely that
the merger will be found unlawful because the market shares of the merging
entities are much smaller.228 By focusing on a narrow product definition of
the Consumer Healthcare Data Market, rather than the broad Consumer Data
Market, and a narrow geographic market of Maryland, there will be a much
better chance for enforcement success.229
Additionally, without narrowly defining the product market, any potential
enforcement may run into similar issues that arose in du Pont with the
Cellophane Fallacy.230 In du Pont, the product market at issue was
Cellophane, the water-proof plastic wrap that is used on cigarette boxes.231
When defining the product market, du Pont was successful in convincing the
court that it did not have a monopoly because Cellophane was also used on
products other than cigarettes, such as meat.232 Since Cellophane was a
product that did not meet the hypothetical monopolist test based on its uses
for products other than cigarettes, in addition to already charging monopoly
pricing, the Cellophane Fallacy came into existence.233 Had the government
been able to narrow the market definition, to only apply to cigarette
packaging, du Pont would have failed the hypothetical monopolist test
because more consumers responded to a price increase for cigarette
packaging.234
For Maryland’s Attorney General to be successful in litigating the
potential Walmart-Humana merger, they will need to follow the Twelve-Step
Rule of Reason analysis to ensure that all of the pro-competitive and anticompetitive effects are fully understood. However, as demonstrated above,235
the Achilles heel of antitrust enforcement actions has been a failure to
narrowly define the relevant market. In the instant analysis, the Twelve-Step
Rule of Reason analysis will lead to a demonstration that the merger between
Walmart and Humana is anti-competitive. The Attorney General will be able
to narrowly define Consumer Healthcare Data Market through the linked
Consumer Retail Data and Health Insurance Markets. Additionally, by
narrowly defining the Consumer Healthcare Data Market, the Attorney
General will be able to show that a new market, driven by data, has been
rapidly growing and has very real anti-competitive effects for Marylanders.
228
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Finally, the Attorney General needs to ensure that the demonstrated anticompetitive effects outweigh any pro-competitive effects.
B. Increased Need for State and Federal Regulation
As Microsoft lost the ability to have a PC monopoly with the browser
market, in order to counter Walmart’s monopoly power, users should be the
primary owners of their data. While outside of the field of antitrust, state and
federal regulators could accomplish this by permitting consumers the right to
control their data, prevent companies from using it, or to withdraw their data
in a usable format.236 There are two recent examples of government
regulators allowing consumers to have more control over their data. First,
the European Union recently implemented the General Data Protection
Requirements (“GDPR”) that imposes strict penalties on companies that do
not comply with its rules of data capture, storage, usage, and sharing.237
Second, California recently passed a similar law to GDPR, the California
Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”) that makes California the developer of
guidelines on consumer data, rather than a company’s internal decisionmakers.238 While these legislative efforts focus on data privacy, rather than
a curb on the antitrust violations in the Consumer Healthcare Data Market,
the legislation represents a model for Maryland and the U.S. Government to
follow.239 The GDPR represented a cosmic shift in the use of enforcement
actions to start to reign in the power of companies and protect consumers
from the technology sector. However, that cosmic shift in enforcement
actions still has many gaps that could be addressed with future legislation.
Some of those gaps include how data should be addressed in antitrust
enforcement and provide greater protection to consumers.
California’s CCPA represents what is sure to be the first of many attempts
by several states to address the use of consumer data by companies.240
However, to promote consistent laws in commerce and to have a more
effective enforcement mechanism that all states can follow, it would be more
effective for Congress to address the issue. If Congress does not act to solve
the issues with data in antitrust enforcement, Maryland should take steps to
lead with antitrust regulations that protect Marylanders from anti-competitive
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effects, as California has with consumer data in the CCPA. The federal
government could seek to address this issue in two ways.
First, the DOJ or FTC could engage in rulemaking as prescribed by the
Administrative Procedure Act’s notice and comment process.241 However,
this process can be lengthy, and it would not have an immediate impact on
the fast-growing Consumer Healthcare Data Market. This delay would leave
consumers with higher prices until the notice and comment period ends.
Second, Congress could enact legislation that specifically targets the
Consumer Healthcare Data Market to prevent antitrust violations in the
industry.
If regulators did increase consumers’ rights to and control over their data,
it might foster competition in the market to improve quality of services to
retain customer data or lower barriers to entry for less data-rich innovators.242
Additionally, by regulating the way that companies can use consumers’ data
and how consumers can monitor and control a company’s use of their data,
regulators can work to ensure a competitive market without the massive cost
of antitrust litigation.243
IV. CONCLUSION
The Consumer Data Market, which is something that affects every citizen
in the United States, has never been more important to focus on than now.
Healthcare costs in the United States have continued to rise and present a
massive issue for consumers who are seeking to address the exorbitant costs
while maintaining a competitive healthcare market.244 The federal
government needs to take action by enforcing the current antitrust laws and
creating new laws that will strengthen antitrust enforcement capabilities by
accounting for changes in today’s economy. These enforcement actions and
new laws will continue to encourage businesses to be innovative while
curbing rampant abuse by companies that are using their monopoly power to
charge higher prices to consumers for healthcare services. Through data
regulations, Maryland can protect its citizens from the potential abuse of their
data in the healthcare industry and ensure that the healthcare market remains
competitive.
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